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Who’s Really Determining Our Social Policy? 
Revisiting the Relationship between Congress and 




Betty Dukes worked as a Wal-Mart employee in Pittsburg, California 
since 1994.1  She started as a cashier, but eventually received a promotion 
to customer service manager.2  Despite years of service and positive 
performance reviews, the employment relationship soured when Wal-Mart 
disciplined Dukes for violating company policy.3  When filing her claim, 
she argued her employer failed to punish its male employees for similar 
infractions and that she was paid less than two male greeters in the 
Pittsburg store.4  
Edith Arana also worked for Wal-Mart in Duarte, California, from 
1995 until 2001.5  She sought management training on multiple occasions, 
but her manager brushed off her requests.6  She concluded she was denied 
opportunity for advancement because of her sex.7  
Similarly, Christine Kwaposki worked for another retail chain, Sam’s 
Club.8  She asserted that a male manager frequently yelled at female 
employees, but did not exhibit the same behavior towards males.9  At one 
point, the manager allegedly told Kwaposki to “‘doll up,’ to wear some 
makeup, and to dress a little better.”10   
 
* Executive Editor, 2013-2014; J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of California, 
Hastings College of the Law; B.A., Politica Science/International Relations, University of 
California at San Diego, 2010.  I wish to thank Professor Dorit Reiss for teaching me how to 
have a multifaceted perspective of the law and for guiding me through the writing process.  I 
also thank Professor Stephanie Bornstein for inspiring me with her passion for employment 
and labor issues.  Special thanks to my family, friends, and Brendan Dreaper for their 
unwavering support.  
 1. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 2547–48. 
 3. Id. at 2548. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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These three women were named plaintiffs to one of the most expansive 
class action suits ever presented to the U.S. Supreme Court.11  They also 
brought a decades-old issue back to the forefront of American media: sex 
discrimination in the workplace.  
______________________________ 
 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, decided in June 2011, occurred nearly 
half a century after the passage of the Civil Rights of Act of 1964.  Title 
VII of the Act prohibits an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, privileges of 
employment” because of sex.12  Title VII thus became extremely 
significant for female employees; without it, the plaintiffs in Dukes would 
not have had an actionable claim.  But Title VII did not eradicate 
discrimination.  If it had, then Dukes and similar cases would be 
nonexistent.  Like many federal laws before it, the statute was left open to 
interpretation, which in turn transformed the employment arena for years to 
come.  How did sex discrimination in the workplace become a salient issue 
in American society?  How did Congress and the courts interact to 
determine social policies in the labor force?  
Answering these questions requires analysis of a critical time period in 
workplace sex discrimination, starting with the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 to the more recent Civil Rights Act of 1991.  The research 
reveals a steep increase in women’s workforce participation, the rise of the 
second feminist movement, and landmark Supreme Court decisions on 
workplace gender equality.  Although grassroots organizations heightened 
public awareness of the gender equality issue, it was mainly the interplay 
between Congress and the judicial system that determined 
antidiscrimination policies.  The government ratified Title VII and left it 
open to judicial interpretation, intervening only when the courts strayed too 
far from the legislature’s original intent.  Aside from the Congressional 
overrides, the judiciary had free reign to delineate the contours of Title VII 
sex discrimination, and thus the two institutions worked together to reshape 
the employment landscape. 
I.BEGINNING TO CLOSE THE GENDER GAP IN THE 
WORKFORCE 
Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, women had no legal recourse for 
sex discrimination at work.  The lack of protection stemmed from 
traditional notions of masculinity and femininity, where men were glorified 
as breadwinners while women were expected to stay at home in order to 
 
 11. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2548. 
 12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
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“preserve [their] maternal functions and ‘the well-being of the race.’”13  
The assumption of female domesticity persisted as a social norm well into 
the twentieth century, and it was believed that any deviance from this norm 
would likely disrupt family cohesion.14  Essentially, the protection of the 
family justified the suppression of women’s labor participation.15 
Post-World War II America witnessed a dramatic rise in the 
participation rate of women in the job market.16  In 1948, approximately 
thirty-five percent of women ages 25-54 were part of the labor force.17  By 
1960, their numbers increased to nearly forty-three percent.18  The mere 
passage of Title VII, despite its heated legislative history, was a testament 
to the demographic shifts in the American workplace.19  Martha Griffiths 
and Katharine St. George were two female congressional representatives 
who fought for the inclusion of “sex” within Title VII.20  Together with 
like-minded congressmen and the influence of the National Women’s Party 
(NWP), they initiated the first step in reducing workplace gender 
inequality.21 
The NWP, largely associated with its advocacy of the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA), was one of the first groups of the second-wave 
feminist movement.22  Former members of the suffrage movement created 
the NWP to continue the pursuit of equality for women in all spheres of 
American society.23  The organization was predominantly comprised of 
middle- and upper-class white females, and thus was not particularly 
concerned with racial minority rights.24  However, given that the early 
version of the ERA failed to pass, the NWP viewed Title VII as another 
“opportunity to advance their goals under the political cover of well-
supported legislation.”25  
Shortly after Congress enacted Title VII, it also established the Equal 
Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) to help interpret and 
enforce the statute.26  However, given that the prohibition on sex 
 
 13. Robert C. Bird, More Than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative 
History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & 
L. 137, 146 (1997) (citing Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908)).  
 14. Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1324 (2012).  
 15. Id. 
 16. Abraham Mosisa & Steven Hipple, Trends in Labor Force Participation in the 
United States, 129 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 35, 42 (2006).  
 17. Id. at 36. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1326. 
 20. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1360. 
 21. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1360; Bird, supra note 13, at 147. 
 22. Bird, supra note 13, at 147. 
 23. Bird, supra note 13, at 147. 
 24. Bird, supra note 13, at 147. 
 25. Bird, supra note 13, at 149. 
 26. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1329.  
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discrimination was new ground, no one at the EEOC in its early years had 
much experience with the issue.27  Many of the legal claims that poured in 
after Title VII’s implementation baffled the agency.28  As one female 
lawyer put it, the agency “was responsible for deciding these questions,” 
but “no one really knew how to resolve them.”29 
Originally, the EEOC appeared hostile to the sex discrimination 
provision.30  In answering one of its first questions regarding sex 
inequality, the EEOC deemed that “the practice of dividing job 
advertisements into male and female columns did not qualify as sex 
discrimination because culture and mores, personal inclinations, and 
physical limitations will operate to make many job categories primarily of 
interest to men or women.”31  This position on sex-segregated advertising 
signaled that the agency interpreted the sex provision of Title VII narrowly, 
much to the dismay of feminists nationwide.32 
In direct opposition to the EEOC’s decision, Betty Friedan, Pauli 
Murray, and other feminists founded the National Organization for Women 
(NOW).33  These activists realized that an organization representing 
women’s interests in the same way the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) represented interests of people 
of color, especially African Americans, was necessary to combat the strong 
influence employers had on Title VII interpretation.34  Unlike the NWP, 
NOW embraced women of color and those from lower socioeconomic 
statuses.35  Indeed, Pauli Murray herself was an African-American lawyer 
who sought both racial and gender equality.36  Rather than ignore the 
struggle for minority rights, NOW acknowledged that race was generally 
regarded as a more serious social problem, yet sought to convince 
Americans that sex discrimination was just as serious.37   
NOW’s emergence heralded the feminist crusade that swept across the 
country.  The movement’s rapid popularity among women was also due in 
part to a powerful tool that first-wave feminists lacked: the invention of the 
television.38  “Because women constitute[d] the largest share of television 
viewers, they . . . emerged as an especially coveted demographic.  As 
 
 27. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1335.  
 28. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1335. 
 29. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1335. 
 30. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1361. 
 31. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1340.  
 32. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1342.  
 33. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1342. 
 34. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1341.  
 35. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1342.  
 36. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on 
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2129 (2002).   
 37. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1342.   
 38. S. Craig Watkins & Rana A. Emerson, Feminist Media Criticism and Feminist Media 
Practices, 571 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SCI. 151, 154 (2000).  
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feminist values and beliefs [became] more broadly disseminated, the 
televisual representations of women [became] more varied, too.”39  
Additionally, mass media coverage allowed feminist protests to be more 
accessible to the public.  According to Carol Hanisch, a feminist who 
joined in protesting Miss America in 1968, “The protest of the Miss 
America Pageant in Atlantic City in September told the nation that a new 
feminist movement is afoot in the land.  Due to the tremendous coverage in 
the mass media, millions of Americans now know there is a Women’s 
Liberation Movement.”40  Combined with the widespread circulation of 
Betty Freidan’s “The Feminist Mystique” and Simone de Beauvoir’s “The 
Second Sex,” television and mass media in general helped disseminate the 
feminist agenda and introduce depictions of women other than the “happy 
homemaker.”41 
As this women’s movement developed, many activists became more 
vocal in their disapproval of employment practices premised on women’s 
traditional duties in the home.42  The old notions of domesticity created a 
fierce backlash in the 1960s as women tried to carve out their space in the 
workforce.43  In 1967, NOW observed that stereotyped conceptions of 
motherhood were “still [being] used to justify barring women from equal 
professional and economic participation and advance, and demanded an 
end to discrimination based on maternity.”44  For instance, defenders of 
discriminatory policies frequently cited pregnancy and the maternal 
responsibilities that followed as rationale for “grounding” stewardesses 
when they became pregnant.45  Stewardesses responded to this justification 
by marching in NOW’s monumental Women's Strike for Equality in the 
summer of 1970, holding signs that read “Storks Fly, Why Can't 
Mothers?,” “We Want Our Babies and Our Wings,” and “Mothers Are Still 
FAA Qualified.”46  It was not until after the controversial decision in 
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert that discrimination because of pregnancy 
would be considered a violation of Title VII.47  
Aside from NOW, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) also 
began to champion women’s rights.48  Since its inception in 1920, the 
 
 39. Watkins & Emerson, supra note 38, at 154. 
 40. Carol Hanisch, What Can Be Learned: Critique of the Miss America Protest (Nov. 
15, 2012), http://library.duke.edu/digitalcollections/media/jpg/missamerica/pdf/maddc01012 
.pdf#pagemode=thumbs. 
 41. Watkins & Emerson, supra note 38, at 154. 
 42. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1360. 
 43. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1360. 
 44. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1360 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 45. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1360. 
 46. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1361. 
 47. Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 963 
(2013).  
 48. Amy Leigh Campbell, Raising the Bar: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the ACLU 
Women’s Rights Project, 11 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 157, 164 (2002).  
VALDEZ (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2014  5:21 PM 
332 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:2 
ACLU had broadly promoted the advancement of all civil liberties.49  By 
1970, however, the organization’s Board of Directors “declared women’s 
rights to be their top legal and legislative priority.”50  It then created the 
Women’s Rights Project (WRP), which was “based on the concept that 
sexual equality would be most effectively realized by systematic litigation 
in the courts that redressed discrimination against women.”51  In a shrewd 
move, the ACLU chose then-Columbia Law School Professor, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, to head the WRP.52  Ginsburg’s tenure and later ascent to the 
U.S. Circuit Court and eventually the Supreme Court marked a successful 
period of cause lawyering for the feminist movement.  
By 1970, it became clear that women were a permanent and integral 
part of the labor force.  Approximately fifty percent of women between the 
ages of twenty-five to fifty-four were employed.53  The gradual influx of 
female participators in the labor force “gave them social visibility, and at 
the same time, facilitated their activities as public actors.  Women's public 
activities appeared ipso facto to be a form of resistance, independent of the 
content of their enunciations.”54  At the same time, gender segregation in 
job occupations persisted.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that 
women filled 99.1% of secretary and typist positions and 98.8% of 
registered nurse positions in 1969.55  In contrast, only 0.1% of engineers 
and 2.9% of lawyers and judges were women.56  Hence, although women 
entered the work force at an unprecedented rate, they were still confined to 
jobs that had been customarily associated with their sex.  
In 1970, the first National Conference on Women and the Law took 
place.57  Feminists in the legal profession organized the forum, which 
brought together female law students and lawyers from around the country 
to participate in workshops and presentations in every area of law.58  Most 
importantly, the Conference proved instrumental in furthering feminist 
jurisprudence, which arose as women began entering law schools in large 
numbers by the late 1960s.59  Students would take the lessons of the 
Conference home with them, along with an expanded professional network 
of other progressive women.60  This would later produce not only new 
 
 49. Campbell, supra note 48, at 163.  
 50. Campbell, supra note 48, at 164.  
 51. Campbell, supra note 48, at 164, 166. 
 52. Campbell, supra note 48, at 164. 
 53. Mosisa & Hipple, supra note 16, at 36.  
 54. Miyera Suarez, Gender and the Law: The Social Science Perspective, 7 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 307, 309 (1999). 
 55. Diane L. Bridge, The Glass Ceiling and Sexual Stereotyping: Historical and Legal 
Perspectives of Women in the Workplace, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 581, 596 (1997). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminist Lawmaking and Historical Consciousness: 
Bringing the Past Into the Future, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 2 (1994). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 3.  
 60. Id.  
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feminist scholarship, but also ideas on how to better advocate for women in 
the court system. 
Congress reaffirmed its dedication to equal rights in the workplace by 
ratifying the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (EEOA).61  The 
legislature’s attitude towards sex equality differed sharply from 1964, when 
the addition of “sex” to Title VII appeared little more than an 
afterthought.62  In explaining the reasoning for the legislation, the House 
Committee Report on the 1972 Amendments stated: “discrimination 
against women continues to be widespread, and is regarded by many as 
either morally or physiologically justifiable.”63  The debates on the House 
floor also reflected a renewed commitment to Title VII’s promise for equal 
rights at work.64  Since Congress knew employers would not heed a 
toothless organization, the Act granted the EEOC the authority to bring 
enforcement litigation in federal court and extended Title VII’s coverage to 
public employers.65 
The history of the women’s movement in the 1960s and early 1970s 
sheds light on how social organizations and public mobilization influenced 
the courts’ Title VII interpretation.  However, these groups had no way of 
directly policing employers to ensure compliance with Title VII.  
Employers continued to resist gender desegregation in the workplace by 
heavily relying on conventional sex roles and the maintenance of the 
traditional family structure.66  Furthermore, Title VII’s text—like most 
statutory texts—was inherently vague.  What did “because of sex” mean 
exactly?  Did “sex discrimination” include pregnancy?  What about sexual 
harassment?  And although it was understood that intentional 
discrimination was forbidden, what about facially neutral practices that had 
discriminatory results?  In order to elicit answers in their favor, feminists 
turned to the court system to advance sex equality in the workplace. 
II.THE CASES THAT CHANGED THE LANDSCAPE IN 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
The arrival of Title VII opened the door to many sex discrimination 
claims and judicial interpretations.  Although the House of Representatives 
approved the 1964 Civil Rights Bill by a vote of 290 to 130, and it passed 
with little challenge in the Senate, the legal battles had only begun.67  
Leaving the language of the statute ambiguous was not atypical of 
Congress; rather, it suggests that the legislature may have adopted a 
“defensive” strategy in order to preserve their political coalitions and 
 
 61. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1346. 
 62. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1346. 
 63. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1346. 
 64. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1347. 
 65. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1346. 
 66. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1347. 
 67. Bird, supra note 13, at 160.  
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personal statuses.68  When a controversial issue reaches the forefront of 
American politics, lawmakers may deflect making precise decisions and 
instead leave the problem to the courts.69  Federal judges, unlike politicians, 
are appointed for life, and thus do not face the same political risks that 
other political actors do when they take strong stands on polemical 
subjects.70  Thus, the transfer of Title VII from a partisan to a nonpartisan 
sector allows for the continuation of policymaking without the peril of 
political accountability.71 
For instance, Mark Graber’s description of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
of 1890 and its consequent judicial interpretation illustrates this political 
strategy.72  In the years following the Reconstruction era, politicians 
realized the economic and political necessity of some centralized effort to 
curb the power of trusts and monopolies.73  However, party moderates were 
unable or unwilling to agree on the extent to which the national 
government could regulate industry monopolies, and thus drafted and 
passed the Sherman Act with vague language.74  Rather than specify 
guidelines, “Sherman and other senators insisted that such a task must be 
left open for the courts to determine in each particular case.”75 
The same approach taken in the Sherman Act’s ratification can also be 
seen in the passage of Title VII.  The statute did not define “sex” or 
“discrimination,” and the legislative history reveals that Congress “did not 
reach any consensus about their post-enactment viability.”76  During the 
floor debates, opponents of the sex amendment argued that such a 
provision would undermine protective labor legislation.77  Advocates 
agreed with this reasoning to some extent: the inclusion of “sex” in Title 
VII would outlaw protective labor legislation because most of it only 
protected men’s rights in better paying jobs.78  Still other proponents 
insisted that protective labor legislation could coexist with Title VII, due to 
an important distinction between “differentiation” and “discrimination.”79  
Realizing that the statute risked not passing if the language was made more 
specific, Congress approved the statute without providing any insight into 
its terminology.80  Although many lamented its ambiguity, in hindsight, 
 
 68. Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the 
Judiciary, 7 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 35, 40 (1993).  
 69. Id. at 42. 
 70. Graber, supra note 68, at 41.  
 71. Graber, supra note 68, at 43. 
 72. Graber, supra note 68, at 45. 
 73. Graber, supra note 68, at 51.  
 74. Graber, supra note 68, at 45. 
 75. Graber, supra note 68, at 52 (internal citations omitted). 
 76. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1330. 
 77. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1330. 
 78. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1330. 
 79. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1330. 
 80. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1332. 
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congressional uncertainty “reminds us that there was no consensus in the 
mid-1960s about which forms of regulation qualified as discrimination 
‘because of sex.’”81  Instead, that type of determination “required 
normative judgments about how far the law should go” in encouraging sex 
equality in the workplace, a responsibility Congress ultimately left to the 
two other branches.82 
The Supreme Court made its first normative judgment about workplace 
gender norms in the 1971 case, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation.83  
The plaintiff, Ida Phillips, responded to a job listing Martin Marietta sent 
out to attract factory assembly workers.84  The company rejected Phillips’s 
application on the grounds that it did not hire women with school-aged 
children.85  Phillips then commenced an action under Title VII alleging that 
she had been denied employment because of her sex.86  The Supreme Court 
overturned the Fifth Circuit, finding that the employer failed to prove that 
its policy of not hiring women with school-aged children but hiring men 
with same-aged children was a “bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or 
enterprise.”87  Thus, while the lower courts accepted Martin Marietta’s 
unqualified explanation that mothers with small children had conflicting 
family obligations, the Supreme Court set a new standard by requiring 
actual evidence that such characteristics negatively impacted the business 
enterprise.88 
The decision in Martin Marietta appears to be a feminist victory only 
at a superficial level.  Realistically, it left the door open for lower courts to 
reinterpret the bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) affirmative 
defense in ways favorable to discriminating employers.89  As long as 
employers could substantiate their argument that their sex discriminating 
policies were a BFOQ, then such policies could be upheld as valid even 
under Title VII.90  The per curiam opinion stated that “the existence of . . . 
conflicting family obligations, if demonstrably more relevant to job 
performance for a woman than for a man” could provide a successful basis 
for the BFOQ.91  Thus, what the Court gave, it then took away: it suggested 
 
 81. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1332-33. 
 82. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1332-33. 
 83. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1356. 
 84. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1356. 
 85. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1356. 
 86. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543 (1971). 
 87. Id. at 544. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Joel Wm. Friedman, Gender Nonconformity and the Unfulfilled Promise of Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 205, 207 (2007). 
 90. Id. at 206. 
 91. Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. at 544. 
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that family obligations, which traditionally impacted women more than 
men, could still justify sex discrimination in the workplace.92 
In the same year, however, the Court held that disparate impact claims 
could be brought under Title VII, a notable triumph for minority 
employees, though that triumph did not specifically belong to women.93  
Willie S. Griggs, an African-American male, along with other African-
African employees, worked for Duke Power Company in its lowest paying 
division, the Labor department.94  In 1965, a year after the Civil Rights Act 
became official, the company “abandoned its policy of restricting Negroes 
to the Labor Department” and instead “required a completion of high 
school [as a] prerequisite to transfer from Labor to any other department.”95  
The company also added a further requirement for new employees to 
“register satisfactory scores on two professionally prepared aptitude 
tests.”96  Griggs and his fellow African American coworkers brought suit 
against Dukes Power Company for racial discrimination under Title VII, 
asserting that both requirements disqualified African Americans at a 
substantially higher rate than white applicants.97  
In nullifying the company’s policy, the Court first looked to Congress’s 
purpose in enacting Title VII.98  It determined that, “under the Act, 
practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in 
terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status 
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”99  Furthermore, if an 
employment practice which operates to exclude African Americans “cannot 
be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.”100  
The facts revealed that neither the high school completion requirement nor 
the general aptitude tests bore a demonstrable relationship to successful job 
performance.101  Since both conditions negatively affected African 
Americans—a minority group who traditionally received inferior education 
in segregated schools—the Court unanimously struck down the company’s 
policy as a violation of Title VII.102 
Griggs was an important victory for minority groups.  The “business 
necessity” standard imposed upon employers set a substantial barrier to 
discriminatory practices, since employers could no longer implement an 
artificial policy that “operate[d] invidiously to discriminate on the basis of 
 
 92. Franklin, supra note 14, at 1356. 
 93. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). 
 94. Id. at 426. 
 95. Id. at 427.  
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 426. 
 98. Id. at 429. 
 99. Id. at 430.  
 100. Id. at 431. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at 432.  
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racial or other impermissible classification.”103  However, failure of an 
employer’s “business necessity” defense did not automatically render good 
news for female plaintiffs.  In Dothard v. Rawlinson, a female applicant 
was rejected for a position as a correctional counselor because she failed to 
meet the minimum 120-pound weight requirement of an Alabama 
statute.104  Rawlinson, the appellee, filed a sex discrimination claim against 
the Alabama Board of Corrections for unlawful sex discrimination.105   
Dothard was the first case where the Supreme Court decided and 
approved an employer’s bona fide occupational qualification defense, 
despite holding that the business necessity defense failed.106  The appellants 
argued the weight and height requirements were job related because the 
minimums were necessary in order to be effective correctional 
counselors.107  However, in finding Alabama’s weight and height 
requirement would exclude 41.13% of women ages eighteen to seventy-
nine yet only less than one percent of males,108 the Court rejected the 
employer’s business necessity defense because “the defendants did not 
provide appropriate evidentiary support for what ‘amount of strength’ a 
guard needed to perform effectively or what height or weight would ensure 
that a guard possessed the requisite strength.”109  The majority criticized the 
appellant for failing to offer statistical analysis or evidence in order to 
justify the statutory standards.110 
The Court did not stop there, however.  Given that twenty percent of 
male prisoners were spread throughout the penitentiaries’ facilities,111 the 
majority found that “a woman’s relative ability to maintain order in a male, 
maximum-security, unclassified penitentiary . . . could be directly reduced 
by her womanhood.”112  Additionally, the probability that “inmates would 
assault a woman because she was a woman would pose a threat not only to 
the victim of the assault but also to the basic control of the penitentiary and 
protection of its inmates and the other security personnel.”113  It was 
suggested that, “if the job-related quality that appellant identified is bona 
fide, their purpose could be achieved by adopting and validating a test for 
applicants that measures strength directly.”114  The Court thus gave 
 
 103. Gary A. Moore & Michael K Braswell, “Quotas” and the Codification of the 
Disparate Impact Theory: What Did Griggs Really Say and Not Say?, 55 ALB. L. REV. 459, 
463 (1991). 
 104. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323 (1977).  
 105. Id. 
 106. Yiyang Wu, Scaling the Wall and Running the Mile: The Role of Physical-Selection 
Procedures in the Disparate Impact Narrative, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1208 (2012). 
 107. Id. at 331.  
 108. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329-30. 
 109. Wu, supra note 106, at 1208. 
 110. Wu, supra note 106, at 1208. 
 111. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 336. 
 114. Wu, supra note 106, at 1208 (quoting Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332). 
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employers an “out” through the BFOQ defense.  Accordingly, the Court’s 
decision went beyond addressing disparate impact and concluded that sex 
discrimination under these circumstances was legal: A person’s 
womanhood alone could undermine the responsibility a correctional 
counselor was expected to undertake.115 
In a famous dissent, Justice Marshall criticized the majority’s decision 
and insisted that the height and weight requirements violated Title VII.116  
He found the dangerous nature of a guard’s occupation irrelevant and 
pointed out the Court’s failure to identify any evidence in the record “to 
support the asserted likelihood that inmates would assault a woman 
because she was a woman.”117  Even if the majority argued that the 
reasoning was “common sense,” it still perpetuated romantic paternalism 
by taking away the woman’s choice to decide for herself whether she was 
able to perform the job.118  In short, the Court preserved one of the old 
myths about women––“that women . . . are seductive sexual objects.  The 
effect of the decision . . . is to punish women because their very presence 
might provoke sexual assaults.”119  Marshall warned that “the pedestal upon 
which women have been placed has . . . upon closer inspection, been 
revealed as a cage.”120  Dothard remains the only gender-based disparate 
claim the Supreme Court has heard.121  
Five years later, the Court also upheld an employer’s disability plan 
that denied women benefits for disabilities arising from pregnancy.122  
Here, the policy openly discriminated against pregnant women, thus the 
petitioners brought a disparate treatment claim under Title VII.123  
Respondent General Electric provided nonoccupational sickness and 
accident benefits to its employees as part of its total compensation 
package.124  Petitioners, however, did not prove that the exclusion of 
pregnancy benefits was mere “‘pretex[t]’ designed to effect an invidious 
discrimination against the members of one sex or the other.”125 Although 
only women could become pregnant, the Court found it was “significantly 
different from the typical covered disease or disability.”126  The majority 
also ignored the EEOC guideline stating that “[d]isabilities caused or 
contributed to by pregnancy. . . and recovery therefrom are, for all job-
 
 115. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 336. 
 116. Id. at 340 (Marshall, J., concurring).  
 117. Id. at 345 (internal quotations omitted).  
 118. Id. at 345 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at 345 (citing Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 20 (1971)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 121. Wu, supra note 106, at 1207.  
 122. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127 (1976).  
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. at 128. 
 125. Id. at 136. 
 126. Id.  
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related purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such under 
any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan available in 
connection with employment.”127  The Court reasoned that Congress did 
not grant the EEOC authority to promulgate rules or regulations, and thus 
judges were not bound by its guidelines.128 
Women criticized Gilbert for adhering “to traditional gender norms 
respecting women’s primary role as mothers rather than workers.  
Feminists argued that employers should share the costs of pregnancy-
related disability, just as they did the costs of other forms of physical 
disability.  Anything short of equal treatment would reinforce sex-role 
stereotypes.”129  Female activists were not the only ones outraged by the 
Court’s ruling.  In response to the controversial decision and public 
discontent, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 
(PDA), its first official criticism of a Title VII judicial interpretation.130  
The PDA—intended to supplement the “because of sex” provision in Title 
VII—redefined illegal sex discrimination to include discrimination 
“because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical 
conditions.”131  
To be sure, Congress does not “overrule” prior Court decisions lightly.  
The legislature must “enact statutory language that supersedes or 
‘overrides’ the decision . . .  Overrides often track relatively closely the 
specific holding or factual application of the decision they seek to 
supersede.”132  This argument holds true for the relationship between the 
PDA and Gilbert.  The first clause of the Act rejected the Court’s formalist 
interpretation of sex equality, while the second clause illustrated the 
legislature’s direct response to the fact pattern at issue in the case.133  
Overrides in general serve a critical function in the legislature’s 
interchange with the courts.  Passing overrides offers Congress “a direct 
means to send follow-up signals to the courts that aim to repair flawed 
statutes, reconcile discordant statutory constructions, and reverse errant 
judicial decisions.”134  Congress hence ended its legislative deference to the 
 
 127. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 140-41 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(b) (1975)).  
 128. Id. at 141. 
 129. Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of 
Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 423 (2011).  
 130. Id. at 431. 
 131. Id. (citing the PDA, which additionally provides that “women affected by pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related 
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000e(k) (2012).  The PDA did not require all employers to have fringe benefits, but simply 
did not allow the exclusion of such benefits to pregnant women.) 
 132. Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory 
Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 531 (2009). 
 133. Dinner, supra note 129, at 431. 
 134.  JEB BARNES, OVERRULED? LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND 
CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS 4-5 (Stanford University Press, 1st ed. 
2004). 
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Court when it felt the judiciary had misinterpreted the purpose behind Title 
VII. 
That same year, another favorable decision towards feminists was 
handed down.  The Supreme Court invalidated an employer’s policy that 
discriminated on the basis of sex.  In City of Los Angeles Department of 
Water & Power v. Manhart, plaintiffs were female employees who were 
required to contribute larger portions to pension funds than male employees 
on the grounds that women as a group live longer than men.135  The Court 
acknowledged that women, a class that lives longer than men, but was 
equally true that not all “individuals share the characteristic that 
differentiates the average class representatives.”136  An individual woman 
may not live as long as the average man and many men outlive the average 
women.137  Because Title VII made it unlawful “to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin” the statute’s inherent language revealed that a true 
generalization about the class was inadequate reasoning to discriminate 
against “an individual to whom the generalization does not apply.”138 
Feminists obtained another labor victory with Washington County v. 
Gunther, which prohibited the County of Washington, Oregon from paying 
female guards in the female section of the county jail lower wages than it 
paid the male guards in the male section.139  At issue was whether the 
Bennett Amendment precluded respondents’ claim of intentional sex 
discrimination regarding depressed wages.140  The Bennett Amendment 
attempted to reconcile Title VII with the Equal Pay Act, stating that “it 
shall not be an unlawful employment practice . . . for any employer to 
differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages 
paid” as long as such differentiation was “due to a seniority system, a merit 
system, a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of 
production; or a differential based on any other factor other than sex.”141  
Since Washington County did not assert any of these four defenses, the 
Bennett Amendment did not bar respondents’ claims of discriminatory 
under-compensation.142 
Despite these legal triumphs for women, it was not until 1986 that the 
Supreme Court finally heard a case regarding the contentious issue of 
sexual harassment in the workplace.  In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, a 
female bank employee brought a sexual harassment suit against her former 
 
 135. City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704 (1978).  
 136. Id. at 707-08. 
 137. Id. at 708. 
 138. Id. at 708. 
 139. Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 163–64 (1981).  
 140. Id. at 166. 
 141. Id. (emphasis added). 
 142. Id. at 181. 
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employer and supervisor under Title VII.143  Mechelle Vinson contended 
that her supervisor and harasser, Sidney Taylor, made repeated demands 
upon her for sexual favors, and although she initially declined, she 
acquiesced for fear of losing her job.144  Meritor eventually terminated her 
for taking excessive leave.145  The Bank attempted to refute Vinson’s claim 
by arguing that Title VII only dealt with “tangible loss of an economic 
character, not purely psychological aspects of the workplace 
environment.”146  The Court, however, did not believe the statute should be 
construed so narrowly.  Unlike the majority in Gilbert, the justices relied 
on the EEOC guidelines, which declared that “sexual harassment” was a 
form of sex discrimination actionable under Title VII.147  Accordingly, the 
Court held that a plaintiff could establish a sex discrimination claim by 
proving that such discrimination created a hostile or abusive work 
environment.148 
One of the divisive issues about Meritor was the admission of Vinson’s 
“sexually suggestive conduct” as evidence against the “unwelcome” 
provision in sexual harassment claims.149  Vinson argued that such proof 
should be ruled inadmissible, analogizing sexual harassment to rape in that 
“evidence of prior unchastity or sexual relations with others is generally 
considered more prejudicial than probative.”150  The Supreme Court 
rebuffed this line of reasoning and instead found the testimony of 
“Vinson’s sexually provocative speech or dress to be obviously relevant to 
the question of whether she found particular sexual advances 
unwelcome.”151  However, women sometimes use certain behavioral 
mechanisms to appear attractive merely because “attractiveness” can have 
economic consequences: “offers of employment and promotions may in 
many instances turn on a woman’s appearance.  Many women have been 
led to believe that success in their careers depends on an appearance of 
sexual receptivity.”152 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, decided in 1989, illustrates feminists’ 
dilemma in defining what it means to be an “ideal” woman in the labor 
force.  Ann Hopkins was a senior manager employed at Price Waterhouse 
when she was nominated for partnership in 1982.153  She was the only 
 
 143. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986).  
 144. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 60. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 64 (internal quotations omitted).  
 147. Id. at 65.  
 148. Id. at 66.  
 149. Victoria T. Bartels, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: The Supreme Court’s 
Recognition of the Hostile Environment in Sexual Harassment Claims, 20 AKRON L. REV. 
575, 583 (1987). 
 150. Id. at 584. 
 151. Bartels, supra note 149, at 584 (internal quotations omitted). 
 152. Bartels, supra note 149, at 585. 
 153. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231 (1989).  
VALDEZ (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2014  5:21 PM 
342 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:2 
woman proposed for partnership at the time out of eighty-eight 
candidates.154  The partners who backed Hopkins consistently praised her 
for her character and her accomplishments within the firm; at the same 
time, she was also criticized for being too abrasive with staff members.155  
Price Waterhouse cited her unsatisfactory interpersonal skills as its 
justification for withholding the partnership from her.156  The lower court 
found that some of these criticisms derived from the fact that she was a 
woman.157  The plurality ruled that sex stereotyping might have played a 
part in the evaluation of Hopkins as a candidate for partnership, which 
meant that the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous.158  Even 
if the employer’s proffered reason about Hopkins’s interpersonal skills was 
true, Price Waterhouse could avoid liability “only by proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision 
even if it had not taken gender into account.”159 
Although a victory for Hopkins, the Supreme Court gave much leeway 
to the employer in its defense against a mixed motive sex discrimination 
claim.  The plurality rejected both lower courts’ holdings that “the 
employer must show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have 
made the same decision without the discrimination,”160 thus granting 
employers a complete affirmative defense to liability.  Furthermore, the 
Court failed to clearly define the legal doctrine of stereotyping and its 
contours.  For example, it said that even though the case before it was 
strong, that fact “did not induce it to place limits on the possible ways of 
proving that stereotyping played a motivated role in an employment 
decision and expressly declined to decid[e] here which specific facts, 
standing alone, would or would not establish a plaintiff’s case.”161  It also 
seemed to employ a “we’ll-know-it-when-we-see-it” approach to sex 
stereotyping: “It takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a 
description of an aggressive female employee as requiring ‘a course at a 
charm school.’”162  Although the circumstances surrounding Price 
Waterhouse led to a decision favorable to the plaintiff, lower courts were 
still left with no guidance on how to discern illicit sex stereotyping.163 
 
 154. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 233. 
 155. Id. at 234. 
 156. Id. at 236.  
 157. Id. at 235.  Evidence revealed that “one partner described her as ‘macho’; another 
suggested that she ‘overcompensated for being a woman’; a third advised her to take ‘a 
course at a charm school.’” Id. 
 158. Id. at 255.  
 159. Id. at 258.   
 160. Beth L. Singletary, Note, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: Clarification of the Standard 
of Causation, Burden of Proof, and Liability in Title VII Employment Discrimination Cases, 
41 MERCER L. REV. 1097, 1111 (1990) (emphasis added). 
 161. Kerri Lynn Stone, Clarifying Sex Stereotyping, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 591, 607 (2011) 
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 163. Id. at 608. 
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The Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse sparked enough controversy 
to elicit another response from Congress, which used its override power 
once more.  The ruling “eviscerated the spirit of Title VII by allowing an 
employer to escape liability even when it is shown that he is guilty of 
discriminatory conduct.”164  Consequently, both houses of Congress passed 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which reversed five Supreme Court 
employment discrimination decisions, including a partial reversal of Price 
Waterhouse: if a plaintiff was successful in establishing a mixed motive 
claim, the employer’s defense would only limit damages, not act as a 
complete defense to liability.165  Additionally, the proposed law provided 
for “retroactive application to fact situations that occurred before the bill 
became law and also to cases then pending on appeal.”166  However, the 
bill’s success was short-lived, as then-President George H. W. Bush vetoed 
it and Congress failed to muster enough votes to override the veto.167  The 
President embraced the goal of eliminating discrimination, but reasoned 
that the 1990 Act created inducements for quotas.168  Although the bill did 
not in fact endorse quotas, opponents were concerned that the proposed 
legislation provided overly complicated new procedural rules and imposed 
the burden of proof on employers.169  Rather than risk costly litigation, 
opponents argued employers would institute quotas instead.170 
Despite the presidential veto, legislators persisted in creating a new 
civil rights bill.  On the first day of the next Congress, House 
representatives introduced the Civil Rights and Women’s Equity in 
Employment Act of 1991, which “added two more Supreme Court cases to 
the list of pro-employer Court decisions the new legislation would 
correct.”171  The Bill passed in the House, but fell flat in the Senate.172  
Finally, both Congress and the President reached a compromise and 
enacted Senate Bill 1745, eventually known as the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.173  The 1991 Act partially overturned Price Waterhouse, stating that 
“‘an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining 
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
 
 164. Nola Zevnick & Ronni Davis, Note, Price Waterhouse Revisited: Will the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 Cure the Defects, 15 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 87, 96 (1993). 
 165. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis of 
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 172. Caryn Leslie Lilling, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: An Examination of the Storm 
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motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other practices 
also motivated the practice.”174  The new statute ensured no employer could 
escape liability if a discriminatory factor played any role in the employer’s 
decision-making; the affirmative defense outlined in Price Waterhouse 
could only be used to limit damages.175  In addition, the 1991 Act codified 
the Griggs model of disparate impact analysis,176 thus reaffirming the 
government’s commitment to reducing employment discrimination. 
III.ANALYZING THE CASES AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
SOCIAL POLICIES 
The Supreme Court, while sometimes appreciated for its non-partisan 
and independent nature, is also often criticized for its inability to enforce 
important decisions.  In the context of employment discrimination, 
however, Title VII empowered the judicial system through the availability 
of damages.  In cases of unlawful intentional discrimination, the statute 
provides that an aggrieved party may obtain back pay for up to two years 
preceding the filing of the charge,177 compensatory and punitive relief,178 
and attorney’s fees and costs in addition to declaratory or injunctive relief 
and reinstatement.179  As more cases began to filter in after the enactment 
of Title VII, employers began to experience firsthand the costliness of 
discriminatory practices. 
Over time, the practice of intentional sex discrimination dwindled.  
Thanks to class action litigation, “policies and practices that effectively had 
excluded minorities from the workforce were struck down as violative of 
the statute.   Orders requiring the hiring or advancement of protected 
groups, as well as substantial back pay awards, encouraged employers to 
examine and reevaluate their employment and promotion criteria.”180  
Between 1970 and 1979, “nearly twelve million more women entered the 
labor force.”181  The influx of females into the workforce in the mid-
twentieth century made it economically impractical for employers to 
openly discriminate against women.  It became more socially acceptable 
for women and mothers to work outside the home.182  This dramatic 
increase in female workplace participation was due in large part to legal 
 
 174. Zevnick & Davis, supra note 164, at 99. 
 175. Zevnick & Davis, supra note 164, at 99. 
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protections against sex discrimination in employment provided by newly 
enacted federal laws183 and judicial precedent. 
 As the cases have illustrated, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify 
and enforce Title VII in various ways, but some interpretations were not 
always aligned with the social policies Congress intended to propagate.  
The aftermath of Gilbert and Price Waterhouse resulted in later 
government intervention, but those too had varying results.  For instance, 
although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 toughened the standard for employer 
liability in mixedmotive cases, it did not define “job-related” and “business 
necessity” in its attempt to address disparate impact claims.184  Following 
the Act’s passage, “courts have developed at least four tests for ‘job 
related’ and ‘business necessity.’”185  Additionally, the Act allowed for 
recovery of punitive damages, but the Supreme Court effectively barred 
punitive damages as long as employers tried to comply with the law in 
good faith.186  To make matters more confusing, the statute did not include 
a “good faith” exception and the Court failed to define what it exactly 
means.187  Thus, the ambiguity of both Congress and the Supreme Court 
has continued to leave much interpretation up the lower courts instead of 
creating a bright-line rule.  
 The varying successes and failures for feminists and women’s rights 
in the workplace can be attributed to the very nature of the American court 
system: adversarial legalism.  According to American legal historian 
Robert Kagan, adversarial law has two salient characteristics.  Firstly, it 
involves legal contestation, where “competing interests and disputants 
readily invoke legal rights, duties, and procedural requirements, which is 
backed by recourse to strong legal penalties, litigation, or judicial 
review.”188  In employment discrimination, the competing interests invoked 
minorities’ statutory rights versus employers’ interests of business 
efficiency and productivity.  Ideally, the system has allowed single 
plaintiffs—who traditionally do not have the same monetary resources as a 
large-scale employer—to obtain justice due to any violation of their rights. 
 The second significant characteristic of adversarial legalism is 
litigant activism, a “style of legal contestation in which the assertion of 
claims, the search for controlling legal arguments, and gathering of 
evidence are dominated by disputing parties who act primarily through 
lawyers.”189  This means that employment lawyers are able to forge 
creative avenues and expose loopholes in order to obtain a favorable 
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decision.  The lack of bright-line rules can thus be advantageous for 
plaintiffs since facts in each case will differ.  However, adversarial legalism 
is a double-edged sword.  Its positive side promotes “openness to new 
ideas” and “an ability to challenge governmental and corporate 
arbitrariness,”190 but by the same token, litigation can be too costly for 
plaintiffs to pursue,191 and the lack of a clear rule translates into high levels 
of legal unpredictability.192 
 Given the pitfalls of the dual-sided nature of adversarial legalism, 
the point of this research is not to overthrow the system or to strictly rely 
upon the legislature, but to better understand the give-and-take between the 
legislature and the courts for the future of sex discrimination litigation.  
Though the decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes was considered by some to be a 
defeat for women, it does not mean that women’s rights in the workforce 
will be curbed.  Since the Supreme Court’s decision, the plaintiffs amended 
their class action and returned to federal district court.193  Judge Charles R. 
Breyer rejected Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss the case and upheld the 
plaintiffs’ right to proceed as a class.194  However, on August 2, 2013, 
Judge Breyer eventually denied the plaintiffs’ motion seeking certification 
for three regional classes consisting of 150,000 current and former Wal-
Mart and Sam’s Club employees.195  The plaintiffs have since filed a 
petitioned with the Ninth Circuit to hear an appeal of the order.196 
In another recent class action case, Ellis v. Costco, federal judge 
Edward M. Chen certified a class of current and former Costco employees 
who alleged that “the wholesale giant failed to promote women to 
management positions at a rate commensurate with male employees.”197  
Judge Chen meticulously outlined the differences between the employees 
in Ellis versus those in Dukes, the most important distinguishing factor 
being that, “[u]nlike in Dukes, which the Supreme Court concluded merely 
identified the delegation of discretion (i.e., the absence of a policy), here 
Plaintiffs identify specific practices and a common mode of guided 
discretion directed from the top levels of the company.”198  Ellis will 
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therefore serve as significant guidance for lower courts in the post-Dukes 
era. 
The beauty (and terror) of adversarial legalism is that a single case will 
not shatter or validate a social movement, as was shown in Dothard, 
Gilbert, and Dukes.  Both successes and failures serve as an impetus for 
change.  For instance, the Equal Rights Amendment, a proposed 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would guarantee equal rights for 
women, has been repeatedly rejected in Congress despite several attempts 
to pass it over the past several decades.  Senator Robert Menendez (R-CA) 
reintroduced the bill to Congress on March 5, 2013, and it is currently 
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.199  Although sex discrimination 
in the labor force is only one driving factor behind the amendment, the 
mounting presence of women in the workplace, and even in Congress, has 
given them a louder voice and more political power than ever before.  
Thus, even though the courts did not single-handedly change societal 
traditions, such changes would not have been possible with the judicial 
system. 
IV.CONCLUSION 
The history of Title VII and its subsequent judicial clarifications 
granted women like Dukes and her fellow respondents the ability to bring 
lawsuits against powerful corporate employers.  At the same time, the 
Supreme Court’s ruling against the respondents speaks to the recent 
hostility against class action claims.200  By discouraging class action claims 
for employees, unjustly treated workers “do not generally bring their claim 
individually . . .  [P]ossible explanations for this phenomenon include the 
cost of litigation, fear of individual involvement in such suits, and 
retribution from the employer.”201  As lower courts apply the Supreme 
Court’s precedent, either lawyers will be forced to find creative ways 
around class action opposition or Congress may have to step in to clarify 
the issue. 
As we have seen, grassroots organizations, Congress, and the courts all 
play important roles in altering social policies within our society.  In the 
context of sex discrimination in the workplace, the second-wave feminist 
movement and the historic entry of women in the labor force first called for 
gender equality in the employment arena.  Once the legislature responded 
to the outcry for social justice, it turned over Title VII to judges to fine-tune 
its ambiguity.  Injured parties then took their claims to court and set in 
motion a series of momentous cases that would further define sex 
discrimination and promote equality.  When necessary, Congress would 
 
 199. S.J. Res. 10, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
 200. Rachel Tallon Pickens, Too Many Riches? Dukes v. Wal-Mart and the Efficacy of 
Class Actions, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 71, 73 (2006). 
 201. Id. at 87. 
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step in and exercise its override power to correct judicial interpretations 
incongruent with legislative purpose.  History has shown that, despite the 
deficiencies and inefficiencies of both the legislature and the judiciary, the 
interaction between these two branches of government will remain essential 
for instituting social policies, for better or worse.  
